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State v. Forrest: Mercy Killing and Malice in North Carolina
A man enters a hospital room where his eighty-three year old father lies
dying. The father is suffering from what seem to be innumerable ailments and
diseases and is in continuous pain. The man knows his father will die soon but
until then there is nothing that can be done to relieve the unrelenting suffering.
In the midst of his anguish, the man is struck with one recurring thought: he
could put an end to his father's suffering. He may even be requested or begged
to do so by his father. It occurs to the man that killing his father would be
illegal. Somehow, however, this seems less important than relieving his father's
suffering, and the man finds the strength and the means to end his father's life.
This scenario has become increasingly more common as developments in
technology enhance our ability to sustain life.1 As new methods of keeping indi-
viduals alive longer are developed, we must confront the myriad ethical, moral,
and legal issues which arise. The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed for
the first time the "mercy killing" issue in State v. Forrest,2 in which the defend-
ant, John Forrest, had killed his critically ill father to end his father's suffering.
In a six to one decision, the supreme court upheld the trial court's conviction of
first-degree murder. Although the court applied the existing North Carolina
law, one commentator stated the decision "shocks the ordinary person's sense of
justice."'3 Should we treat the humanitarian killing in the same manner in which
we handle the depraved-heart murder? This Note suggests that mercy killings
present in certain situations a mitigating circumstance capable of reducing first-
'degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. Additionally, this Note concludes
that the state legislature should enact legislation providing that under certain
circumstances and when proper procedures have been followed, killing for the
purpose of ending an individual's suffering should be permitted. Only by these
actions can our laws begin to reflect the effect of technological advances on our
concept of human life.
On December 22, 1985, John Forrest admitted his eighty-three year old
father, Clyde Forrest, into Moore Memorial Hospital.4 Clyde Forrest had al-
ready had one heart attack and presently was suffering from numerous ailments,
including severe heart disease, hypertension, calcification of his heart valves, a
1. See T. BEAUCHAMP & S. PERLIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH & DYING 216 (1978).
2. 321 N.C. 186, 362 S.E.2d 253 (1987). The term "mercy killing" is given the following
definition:
MERCY KILLING. Euthanasia. The affirmative act of bringing about immediate death al-
legedly in a painless way and generally administered by one who thinks that the dying
person wishes to die because of a terminal or hopeless disease or condition.
BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 891 (5th ed. 1979). Euthanasia, from the Greek meaning "happy
death," is often divided into the categories "passive" and "active." For a discussion of the passive/
active distinction, see infra notes 83 to 89 and accompanying text.
3. Court Shows No Mercy, The News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 5, 1987, at 14A, col.
1.
4. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 188, 362 S.E.2d at 253.
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thorac aneurism, pulmonary emboli, and a peptic ulcer. 5 Clyde Forrest had
spent all but six of the last forty-two days in the hospital.6 By the morning of
December 23, his medical condition was determined untreatable and he was
moved to a comfortable room. 7 John Forrest spent December 23 at home in his
room alone, crying and waiting for word of his father's death.8
On December 24, 1985, Forrest went to the hospital to visit his father.
While a nurse's assistant tended to his father, Forrest told her, "There is no need
in doing that. He's dying." She responded, "Well, I think he's better." Forrest
was then left alone with his father. When the nurse's assistant and a nurse re-
turned, Forrest restated his belief that his father was dying. The nurse told the
defendant, "I don't think your father is as sick as you think he is." Defendant
responded, "Go to hell. I've been taking care of him for years. I'll take care of
him."9 Left alone with his father a second time, Forrest began to cry and to tell
his father how much he loved him. Soon thereafter, his father began to cough,
emitting a gurgling and rattling noise. Extremely upset, Forrest pulled a small
pistol from his pants pocket, put it to his father's temple, and fired four times.10
After the shooting, Forrest, crying and mumbling, walked out to the hallway
where he dropped the gun on the floor. He did not threaten anyone or attempt
to run. The pathologist who performed the autopsy on Clyde Forrest, determin-
ing the cause of death to be the four bullet wounds to the head," stated the
deceased had been "in a great deal of stress" and probably would have died
within twenty-four hours.
12
When questioned at the hospital by police, an emotionally wrought John
Forrest made the following statements:
You can't do anything to him now. He's out of his suffering....
I killed my daddy. He won't have to suffer any more.... You can put
me in jail, lock me up. You can do anything you want with me, but my
father won't have to suffer any longer.... I know they can burn me
for it, but my dad will not have to suffer anymore .... I know the
doctors couldn't do it, but I could.... I promised my dad I wouldn't
let him suffer.
13
At Forrest's trial, the case was submitted to the jury for one of four possible
5. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 2, State v. Forrest, 321 N.O. 186, 362 S.E.2d 253 (1987)
(No. 705A86).
6. Id. at app. 29.
7. Mr. Forrest was classified as "No Code," meaning no extraordinary measures would be
used to save his life. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 188, 362 S.E.2d at 253. Life-support treatment may have
prolonged Clyde Forrest's life by a matter of days. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at app. 36-37. The'
doctor, the hospital and the family all agreed to forego such extraordinary efforts. Id. at app. 30.
8. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 2.
9. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 189, 362 S.E.2d at 254.
10. Forrest's gun was a single action .22-caliber five shot revolver and had to be cocked each
time it was fired. Id. Forrest stated that as a truck driver, he carried the gun with him at all times
for protection. The court noted, however, that Forrest had not worked that day. Id. at 196, 362
S.E.2d at 258.
11. Id. at 189, 362 S.E.2d at 254.
12. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 3.
13. Brief for the State at 2.
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verdicts: first-degree murder, second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter,
or not guilty. 14 After deliberating at great length, 15 the jury found John Forrest
guilty of first-degree murder. 16 The trial judge accordingly sentenced Forrest to
imprisonment for life as required by state law.1
7
Forrest's primary argument on appeal was that the trial court committed
reversible error in its jury instruction concerning malice. 18 Forrest maintained
that inasmuch as the evidence rebutted the existence of malice, his constitutional
right to due process was violated by the instruction permitting an inference of
malice from the use of a deadly weapon. 19 Forrest further argued the instruc-
tion was inadequate and misleading because it failed to define the phrase "just
cause, excuse or justification," 20 thus "improperly suggesting the exculpatory
evidence did not negate malice or show heat of passion."'21
The North Carolina Supreme Court found no fault with the jury instruc-
tion. The court first held that the instruction used by the trial court was "in
accord with the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction and the extensive
North Carolina case law."'22 Second, the court stated that the jury was properly
instructed .that malice could only be inferred, not presumed, and that the jury
was not compelled to reach such a finding.23 Third, the court held that it was
unnecessary for the trial court to instruct the jury on heat of passion.24 The
14. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 189, 362 S.E.2d at 254. The trial court gave instructions on each of
the four possible verdicts. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at app. 6-9.
15. After several hours of deliberation, during which the jury requested to have the instructions
concerning malice repeated three times, the jury was unable to reach a decision and was allowed to
recess for the evening. The jury finally reached its verdict the next morning. Defendant-Appellant's
Brief at app. 11-28.
16. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 189, 362 S.E.2d at 254.
17. Conviction of first-degree murder in North Carolina is punishable by death or life imprison-
ment. N.C. GEN. STAT_ § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1987). A jury must make a finding of aggravating
circumstances to impose the death penalty. NC. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983). Before the For-
rest trial, the state stipulated to the absence of any such factors, precluding the possibility of a death
sentence. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 189, 362 S.E.2d at 253.
18. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Malice means not only hatred, ill-will or spite, as it is ordinarily understood; to be sure
that's malice. But it also means that condition of the mind that prompts a person to take
the life of another intentionally, or to intentionally inflict serious bodily harm which proxi-
mately results in his death without just cause, excuse or justification.
If the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the victim with
a deadly weapon, or intentionally inflicted a wound upon the victim with a deadly weapon
that proximatley [sic] caused the victim's death you may infer, first, that the killing was
unlawful. Second, that it was done with malice. But you are not compelled to do so. You
may consider this, along with all other facts and circumstances in determining whether the
killing was unlawful and whether it was done with malice.
I charge that it is not a legal defense to the offense of murder if the defendant, John
Forrest, at the time of the shooting believed his father, Clyde Forrest, to be terminally ill or
in danger of immediate death. But you may consider such belief in determining whether
the killing was done with malice.
Forrest, 321 N.C. at 190-91, 362 S.E.2d at 255.
19. Id. at 190, 362 S.E.2d at 255.
20. Id. at 192, 362 S.E.2d at 255.
21. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 9.
22. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 191, 362 S.E.2d at 255.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 192, 362 S.E.2d at 256.
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court stated that in the past it had "narrowly construed the requirement under
the 'heat of passion' doctrine that provocation be adequate and reasonable."
25
The court was unwilling to hold that "where defendant kills a loved one in order
to end the deceased's suffering, adequate provocation to negate malice is neces-
sarily present."'26 Accordingly, the court upheld the decision of the trial
court.
2 7
In dissent, Chief Justice Exum argued that:
[S]omeone who kills because of a desire to end a loved one's physical
suffering caused by an illness which is both terminal and incurable
should not be deemed in law as culpable and deserving of the same
punishment as one who kills because of unmitigated spite, hatred or ill
wiUl.
2 8
Exum stated that the two types of killing differed because "the former [was]
without, and the latter with, malice."' 29 The Chief Justice believed the absence
of malice, though not a defense to murder, was a mitigating factor, justifying
reducing murder to manslaughter. 30 Exum concluded that the jury was con-
fused by the instruction which first suggested that only matters which excused
or justified the killing altogether could rebut the element of malice, and second,
failed to explain that circumstances in mitigation were capable of negating mal-
ice.3 1 The Chief Justice believed this error was sufficiently prejudicial to war-
rant a new trial.
32
Homicide laws in North Carolina are not dissimilar to laws in other juris-
dictions. First-degree murder in North Carolina is "the intentional and unlaw-
ful killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and
25. Id.
26. Id. at 193, 362 S.E.2d at 256. The court stated that the heat of passion doctrine was to be
reserved for those instances when a defendant killed without premeditation and deliberation and
without malice. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. The court concluded that in the present
action there was "irrefutable proof" of premeditation and deliberation. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 193,
362 S.E.2d at 256.
27. Forrest raised two additional issues on appeal. Forrest's second argument was that the
prosecution presented insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation for the trial court to
have submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 194, 362 S.E.2d at
257. The supreme court noted, however, that Clyde Forrest did not provoke his son's actions and
that John Forrest fired four shots with a gun which had to be cocked each time. Additionally, the
court noted that although Forrest carried a gun for protection as a truck driver, he was not working
on the day of the shooting. Of more significance, the court believed, were Forrest's statements made
to police following the shooting. The court held these facts all contributed to a finding that the
killing was premeditated and deliberate. Id.
Finally, Forrest assigned as error the trial court's inquiry into the numerical division of the
deliberating jury and the court's subsequent instruction to try to reach a unanimous decision. Id. at
197, 362 S.E.2d at 258. The supreme court held that the trial court properly emphasized that no
juror was to surrender his or her own conscientious convictions and that the court's instruction
therefore did not constitute error. Id. at 199, 362 S.E.2d at 260.
28. Id. at 200, 362 S.E.2d at 260 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
29. Id. (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
31. Id. (Exum, C.J., dissenting). Exum argued this confusion was demonstrated by the jury's
three requests that the trial court repeat the malice instructions. Id. at 201, 362 S.E.2d at 260
(Exum, CJ., dissenting); see supra note 15.
32. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 201, 362 S.E.2d at 260 (Exum, CJ., dissenting).
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deliberation." 33 Murder in the second degree is any unlawful killing of a human
being with malice but without premeditation and deliberation. 34 Voluntary
manslaughter, on the other hand, is the intentional and "unlawful killing of an-
other without malice and without premeditation and deliberation. ' 35
The term "malice" has one of the more conceptually elusive meanings in
criminal law. Although its non-legal meaning is "ill-will," .spite," or "malevo-
lence," in law "malice" is used "to indicate generally a wrongful act which is
done intentionally without just cause or excuse."'36  One commentator has
written:
Although when used in its non-legal sense the word clearly denotes an
evil or wicked state of mind, at law it does not necessarily have such a
connotation; at law it simply means that the actor intentionally did
something unlawful. Thus, the legal meaning of "malice" is confusing
to a non-lawyer because an individual may act with good reason or
from humanitarian motives but, as a matter of legal terminology, he
has acted with "malice" if his act is against the law. 37
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined malice as "not only hatred,
ill-will, or spite.., but... also.., that condition of the mind which prompts a
person to take the life of another intentionally, without just cause, excuse, or
justification."'38 The supreme court has also stated that malice exists as a matter
of law "whenever there has been a wrongful and intentional killing of another
without excuse or mitigating circumstances." 39 Although North Carolina
courts appear to use these definitions interchangeably, the two meanings differ
33. State v. Jackson, 317 N.C. 1, 23, 343 S.E.2d 814, 827 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S.
Ct. 1271 (1987); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1987). Premeditation exists when an act
is thought out beforehand for some length of time, no matter how short. Jackson, 317 N.C. at 23,
343 S.E.2d at 827. Deliberation is an intent to kill carried out in a cool state of blood and not under
the influence of a violent uncontrollable passion. Id. The term "cool state of blood" means the
defendant's anger or emotion must not have been such as to overcome her ability to reason. Id.; see
also State v. Tyson, 307 N.C. 679, 683, 300 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1983) (anger and emotion must not be
such as to "disturb the faculties and reason").
34. Tyson, 307 N.C. at 682, 300 S.E.2d at 368. Second-degree murder does not require an
actual intent to kill but does require some intentional act which sufficiently demonstrates malice and
which proximately causes death. State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 580, 247 S.E.2d 905, 915 (1978).
35. State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 692, 343 S.E.2d 828, 845 (1986). Voluntary manslaughter is a
lesser included offense of murder. Id.
36. Purver, The Language of Murder, 14 UCLA L. Rav. 1306, 1306 (1967). Black's Law
Dictionary defines malice as it relates to murder as "that condition of the mind which prompts one
to take the life of another without just cause or provocation. A willful or corrupt intention of the
mind. It includes not only anger, hatred and revenge, but also every other unlawful and unjustifiable
motive." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (5th ed. 1979).
37. Purver, supra note 36, at 1306.
38. State v. Benson, 183 N.C. 795, 799, 111 S.E. 869, 871 (1922); accord State v. Myers, 299
N.C. 671, 677, 263 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1980); State v. Hamilton, 77 N.C. App. 506, 511, 335 S.E.2d
506, 509-10 (1985), cert denied, 395 N.C. 593, 315 S.E.2d 33 (1986). This language has been
adopted by the courts as part of the jury instruction concerning malice and was used by the Forrest
trial court judge. See supra note 18. Malice has also been defined as any act evidencing "wickedness
of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind bent on mis-
chief." State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 687, 185 S.E.2d 129, 135 (1971) (Sharp, J., dissenting); accord
State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 581, 247 S.E.2d 905, 917 (1978).
39. State v. Baldwin, 152 N.C. 822, 829, 68 S.E. 148, 151 (1910); accord State v. Moore, 275
N.C. 198, 206, 166 S.E.2d 652, 657 (1969); State v. Hough, 61 N.C. App. 132, 134, 300 S.E.2d 409,
411, cert denied, 308 N.C. 193, 302 S.E.2d 246 (1983); see also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL
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substantially. Mitigating circumstances do not justify or excuse the crime but
may reduce the degree of culpability. 40
The supreme court has stated on more than one occasion that "[t]he inten-
tional use of a deadly weapon proximately causing death gives rise to the pre-
sumption that (1) the killing was unlawful, and (2) the killing was done with
malice."' 4 1 In State v. Hankerson,42 however, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a presumption of malice and unlawfulness are not constitution-
ally acceptable when evidence of mitigating or justifying circumstances have
been properly put before the court.4 3 Once such evidence has been introduced,
proof of intentional killing with a deadly weapon could raise only an inference of
malice and unlawfulness. 44 To reduce a conviction of murder to voluntary man-
slaughter, therefore, the defendant must overcome an inference of malice by
showing that he killed his victim in the heat of passion "caused by provocation
adequate to negate the element of malice."
45
The term "heat of passion" is not limited to rage, anger, or resentment, but
may also include fear, terror, excitement, or nervousness. 46 North Carolina
courts have consistently held that mere words or insulting language are insuffi-
cient to provide adequate provocation. 47 On the other hand, assault or
threatened assault is sufficient to constitute adequate provocation,48 as is discov-
LAw § 7.10 (2d ed. 1986) (voluntary manslaughter is a killing under circumstances which mitigate
though do not justify or excuse the killing).
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 903-04 (5th ed. 1979); see infra note 59 and accompanying
text.
41. State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 677, 263 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1980) (quoting State v. Bush, 289
N.C. 159, 221 S.E.2d 333, death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809 (1976)); accord State v. Strickland,
307 N.C. 274, 295, 298 S.E.2d 645, 659 (1983). The presumption of malice dates back to State v.
Ellick, 60 N.C. 450 (1864), in which the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
When it is proved that one has killed intentionally, with a deadly weapon, the burden of
showing justification, excuse or mitigation is on him.... [Tihe fact of the homicide must
be proved by the State; but if found, or admitted, the onus of showing justification, excuse,
or mitigation is upon the prisoner.
Ellick, 60 N.C. at 459, 462; see State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 644-45, 220 S.E.2d 575, 586
(1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
42. 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
43. Id. at 651, 220 S.E.2d at 589. Hankerson was based on a United States Supreme Court
ruling in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Hankerson, 288 N.C. at 643, 220 S.E.2d at 584.
The Mullaney Court held that when evidence of heat of passion has been properly introduced the
presumption of malice is unconstitutional. Mullaney, at 704. The Court in Mullaney was asked to
rule on a Maine law requiring the defendant to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he
acted in the heat of passion once the prosecution proved an unlawful and intentional killing. Id. at
686. The Supreme Court held that "the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation." Id. at 703-04.
44. Hankerson, 288 N.C. at 651, 220 S.E.2d at 589; see State v. Jones, 56 N.C. App. 259, 271,
289 S.E.2d 383, 391-92, cert denied, 305 N.C. 762, 292 S.E.2d 578 (1982); see also, State v. Batts,
303 N.C. 155, 161, 277 S.E.2d 385, 389 (1981) ("Malice may be proven either by direct evidence or
by inference from the circumstances surrounding the killing.").
45. State v. Best, 79 N.C. App. 734, 736, 340 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1986). Voluntary manslaughter
can also be found when the defendant kills in self-defense using greater than necessary force. See
State v. Rummage, 280 N.C. 51, 185 S.E.2d 221 (1971); State v. Burden, 36 N.C. App. 332, 244
S.E.2d 204, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 468, 246 S.E.2d 216 (1978).
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (5th ed. 1979).
47. State v. MceCray, 312 N.C. 519, 324 S.E.2d 606 (1985); State v. Montague, 298 N.C. 752,
259 S.E.2d 899 (1979).
48. State v. Williams, 296 N.C. 693, 252 S.E.2d 739 (1979); State v. Hamilton, 77 N.C. App.
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ery of a spouse committing an act of adultery.49 Although North Carolina here-
tofore has not faced the issue of euthanasia, other jurisdictions have held that a
killing committed to end another's suffering is not performed in the heat of
passion.50
Applying the above definitions, the decision by the supreme court in State v.
Forrest, arguably, was correct. The defendant walked into a room and shot his
victim four times in the head, the victim by no means having provoked the de-
fendant. After the shooting, the defendant confessed to having shot the victim
intentionally, and to having thought about it beforehand. Viewed abstractly and
without regard to the defendant's motive or emotional state, the court's convic-
tion was clearly correct. The Forrest case, however, should not be viewed in
such a simplistic manner.
The supreme court held that because "irrefutable proof" of premeditation
and deliberation was introduced, a jury instruction on heat of passion would
have .been improper.51 The mere fact that specific conduct does not fit into the
traditional notions of heat of passion, however, should not, without more, give
rise to a presumption of malice when the evidence rebuts the existence of
malice.
52
Chief Justice Exum argued that Forrest's conviction should have been re-
duced to voluntary manslaughter. 53 Indeed, one is left questioning why John
Forrest should be punished more severely than an individual who, in a fit of
rage, intentionally kills an unfaithful spouse, 54 or kills in retaliation for an as-
506, 335 S.E.2d 506 (1985), cert. denied, 315 N.C. 593, 341 S.E.2d 33 (1986). Indeed, one court of
appeals decision stated that only "circumstances amounting to an assault or a threatened assault"
can give rise to reasonable or adequate provocation. State v. Spicer, 50 N.C. App. 214, 222-23, 273
S.E.2d 521, 527, appeal dismissed, 302 N.C. 401, 279 S.E.2d 356 (1981).
49. State v. Ward, 286 N.C. 304, 312-13, 210 S.E.2d 407, 413-14 (1974), vacated in part, 428
U.S. 903 (1976); State v. Long, 87 N.C. App. 137, 141, 360 S.E.2d 121, 123-24 (1987).
50. See People v. Gindorf, 159 Ill. App. 3d 647, 661, 512 N.E.2d 770, 779 (1987); Gilbert v.
State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 494 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1986); State v.
Lancaster, 106 Ohio App. 401,407, 155 N.E.2d 215, 219 (1957), aff'd, 167 Ohio St. 391, 149 N.E.2d
157 (1958); People v. Kirby, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. (N.Y.) 28, 31 (1823). Courts in the United States
have long held that a person who intentionally takes the life of another can be convicted of murder
even if the victim was about to die from other causes. See State v. Be Bee, 113 Utah 398, 195 P.2d
746 (1948); People v. Cione, 293 I1. 321, 127 N.E. 646 (1920); People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61 (1874);
Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816).
51. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 193, 362 S.E.2d at 256. It is worth noting, however, that the North
Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that because premeditation and deliberation relate to mental
processes, they are not readily susceptible to direct proof but must be implied by the jury from
circumstantial evidence. State v. Jackson, 317 N.C. 1, 23, 343 S.E.2d 814, 827 (1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1271 (1987); see also State v. Marshall, 304 N.C. 167, 173, 282 S.E.2d 422, 426
(1981) (deliberation can rarely be proved but must be determined from the circumstances). But cf
State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 564, 143 S.E. 187, 193 (1928) (premeditation and deliberation must
be proved by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt).
52. By emphasizing the propriety of the given instruction, the court indicated malice could not
be presumed. Had the supreme court believed mitigating circumstances were not validly introduced,
it would have been more consistent to conclude that the trial court's instruction to the jury erred in
favor of Forrest, and that the trial court could have instructed the jury that malice could be
presumed.
53. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 200, 362 S.E.2d at 260 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
54. See State v. Ward, 286 N.C. 304, 312-13, 210 S.E.2d 407, 413-14 (1974), vacated in part,
428 U.S. 903 (1976); State v. Long, 87 N.C. App. 137, 141, 360 S.E.2d 121, 123-24 (1987).
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sault on a family member,55 or kills in fear of threatened assault.5 6 The supreme
court's decision equates this humanitarian killing with the murder committed
out of "wickedness of heart."' 57 When viewed in light of other North Carolina
homicide cases, the Forrest decision appears to lack consistency.5 8
Chief Justice Exum believed the trial court failed to recognize the distinc-
tion between excuse and mitigation.59 The Chief Justice argued "[t]he instruc-
tions were that only matters which excused the killing altogether were sufficient
to rebut the element of malice." ° Without adding "and without mitigation,"
Exum concluded, the instruction was incomplete. 61 Additionally, the court pro-
vided no definition for "just cause, excuse or justification." Though the trial
judge instructed the jury it was not compelled to infer malice, he also stated "it
is not a legal defense to the charge of murder if the defendant... believed his
father... to be terminally ill or in danger of death."' 62 It was never explained to
the jury that the defendant's belief could serve as a mitigating circumstance re-
ducing the crime to manslaughter. Therefore, because no explanation was given
as to what could constitute "just cause, excuse or justification," and the one
mitigating circumstance was not a legal defense to murder, the jury was left with
no theory by which the inference of malice could be negated and appears to have
concluded by default that Forrest acted with malice.
63
The supreme court's holding leaves uncertain what the State must prove
and the defendant must rebut. It has become evident that malice, at law, does
not mean hatred or enmity. The aching question thus remains what does malice,
55. See State v. John, 30 N.C. 330 (1848).
56. See State v. Haight, 66 N.C. App. 104, 310 S.E.2d 795 (1984).
57. One commentator was forced to query, "Is the law so heartless that it does not distinguish
between the gravity of these offenses--or is it the court that is heartless?" Court Shows No Mercy,
The News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 5, 1987, at 14A, col. 1.
58. See, ag., State v. Flemming, 296 N.C. 559, 251 S.E.2d 430 (1979) (defendant convicted of
second-degree murder after chasing his totally naked victim down the street with a knife and then
standing over her roughly five minutes inflicting thirty-three stab wounds); State v. Blake, 83 N.C.
App. 77, 349 S.E.2d 78 (1986), aff'd, 319 N.C. 599, 356 S.E.2d 352 (1987) (Hours after the victim
had shot at the defendant's car and police had taken the victim's weapon, the defendant drove to the
victim's home and chased the victim out to the street where the defendant shot and killed him. The
defendant was convicted of second-degree murder.); see also State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247
S.E.2d 905 (1978) (father of abused child convicted of second-degree murder for his total disregard
for human life after his two-year-old son died from being kicked and abused generally); State v.
Mapps, 45 N.C. App. 574, 264 S.E.2d 348 (1980) (mother of severely battered, developmentally slow
five-year-old child with many broken bones which had never been treated found guilty of second-
degree murder when child died as a result of the beatings).
59. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 200, 362 S.E.2d at 260 (Exum, C.J., dissenting). "Mitigating circum-
stances" are defined as such that "do not constitute a justification or excuse of the offense in ques-
tion, but which in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of
normal culpability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 903-04 (5th ed. 1979). An "excuse" at law is a
justification for a specific act which will serve to excuse liability altogether. See id. at 804.
60. Forest, 321 N.C. at 200, 362 S.E.2d at 260 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Exum, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, at least one authority has defined malice as an attempt
to do the actual harm done without "justification, excuse or mitigation." See R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 428 (5th ed. 1977). Some North Carolina courts have
ruled that malice exists where there has been no "excuse or mitigation." See supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
62. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 191, 362 S.E.2d at 255; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
63. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 201, 362 S.E.2d at 260 (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
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in law, mean? Clearly the jury in the Forrest trial struggled with this same ques-
tion.6 The supreme court in Forrest offers no further explanation as to the legal
meaning of malice. Taking a 'you-know-it-when-you-see-it' approach, the court
has defined malice by stating what it is not. With this decision, the court has
effectively broadened the concept of malice to include any act not committed in
self-defense or in the heat of passion. At the same time, it has narrowly con-
strued 'heat of passion' so as to not include the passionate killing of a loved one
committed to end that individual's implacable pain and suffering. According to
the supreme court, malice exists when no mitigating circumstances are present.
This holding fails to recognize that an absence of malice is itself a mitigating
circumstance.
In the written law, mercy killing is murder.65 When brought to trial, how-
ever, defendants in mercy killing cases are rarely convicted of murder.6 6 By one
count, fifty-six cases of mercy killing were reported between 1920 and 1985.67
In only ten of these fifty-six cases were the defendants found guilty of criminal
homicide and imprisoned. 68 Of the remaining forty-six, twenty received sus-
pended sentences, fifteen were acquitted, six cases were dismissed, and five were
never brought to trial.
69
This inconsistency often is the result of jury sympathy with the defendant.
As an example, in 1967 Robert Waskin shot his mother who was dying of leuke-
mia and in terrible pain. Waskin was charged with murder but the jury found
him not guilty.70 One commentator stated that "[f:rom a legal point of view, the
jury's verdict was incorrect.... But, when juries are faced with cases like this
64. See supra note 15.
65. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 58 (3d ed. 1982); Kamisar, Some Non-
Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV 969, 970 (1958); see
also J. RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE 168 (1986) (American law makes no distinction between murder
and euthanasia); Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
48 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1202, 1205 (1973) ("[rhose special factors which may be said to distin-
guish euthanasia from more reprehensible forms of killing-a humanitarian motive, possible consent
from the victim, the victim's hopeless condition-are irrelevant in the eyes of the law.").
66. This gap between law and practice does not always exist as a court occasionally will apply
the law as written. In a recent case in Florida, in which seventy-five-year-old Roswell Gilbert shot
and killed his ailing wife, the Florida Supreme Court held that euthanasia is not a defense to first-
degree murder and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185,
1190 (Fla. 1986). The Gilbert case marked the first instance in several years in which a defendant
had been handed the full weight of the law for a mercy killing. One attorney, trying to explain the
excessiveness of Gilbert's sentence, stated, "The jury was over worked. They were tired. Gilbert
wouldn't cry. The weather was real bad, too." D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKETr, THE RIGHT TO DIE
216 (1986). The court in Gilbert concluded that whether courts should be allowed to distinguish
between different kinds of wrong-doers "must be decided by the legislature and not by the judicial
branch." Gilbert, 487 So. 2d at 1192. Ironically, only two years earlier in the same Florida county,
Hans Florian was not even indicted for the shooting of his Alzheimer-stricken wife, committed
under "strikingly similar circumstances." D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKE'rr, supra, at 215.
Gilbert does not support the Forrest decision. Whereas Clyde Forrest was confined to a bed and
expected to die soon, Emily Gilbert, although suffering from osteoporosis and Alzheimer's disease
and in continuous pain, was active and able to move about on her own. See'Gilbert, 487 So. 2d at
1187.
67. D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKET'r, supra note 66, at 208.
68. D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKETT, supra note 66, at 208.
69. D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKETT, supra note 66, at 208-09; see also Survey, supra note 65, at
1213-14 & n.82.
70. J. RACHELS, supra note 65, at 168. As another example, in a 1939 case a jury acquitted
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one, they often refuse to convict." 71
On other occasions, it is the judge who softens the law's harsh impact.
When William Jones's wife, an amputee/diabetic in continuous pain, begged to
be put to death, Jones electrocuted her. The judge, "who was said to have wept
as he pronounced the sentence, sentenced [Jones] only to a year and a day."' 72
Defense tactics also can operate to avoid first-degree murder convictions.
Carol Ann Paight was acquitted on the grounds of temporary insanity in 1950
after shooting her cancer-stricken father once in the temple.73 In 1938 Harry
Johnson was charged with first-degree murder for asphyxiating his wife who
had been ill with cancer for four and a half years. Johnson was judged tempo-
rarily insane and was freed without a trial.74
The recent trend in mercy killing cases has been to order probation or sus-
pended sentencing. In 1978 George Hoffman fired three shots into his seventy-
nine-year-old bedridden wife. After plea bargaining to manslaughter, the judge
ordered fifteen years probation.75 In 1981 Woodrow Collums, age sixty-nine,
shot his brother Jim three times in the head and twice in the stomach. Jim
Collums, who was dying of Alzheimer's disease and being kept alive by feeding
tubes, had previously asked his doctor to end his life. Woodrow Collums was
given ten years probation and ten hours of work per week at a senior citizen
center.76 In 1982 Martin Stephenson, age 27, received burns over 62% of his
body after dousing himself with gasoline and igniting it. The night before Mar-
tin was to undergo further reconstructive surgery on his neck and head, he was
shot and killed by his father. Martin Stephenson's father was found guilty of
manslaughter and given a suspended sentence of five to fifteen years and one
hundred hours community service per month for five years.
7 7
Louis Greenfield of first-degree manslaughter after he killed his "incurable imbecile" son through
chloroform poisoning. Kamisar, supra note 65, at 1021 n.180.
71. J. RACHELS, supra note 65, at 169. Juries are not always sympathetic. After John Noxon
electrocuted his six month old Down's syndrome son in 1943, he tried to lie his way out of it by
claiming it had been an accident. The jury did not believe Noxon and convicted him of first-degree
murder. In an ironic twist, Noxon was sentenced to death by electrocution. The sentence was later
commuted to six years to life and Noxon was paroled after six years. Kamisar, supra note 65, at
1022 n.182.
72. J. RACHELS, supra note 65, at 169.
73. Kamisar, supra note 65, at 1020. Paight's father, still under the anesthetic from the opera-
tion which revealed the stomach cancer, never knew he had cancer. Id.
74. D. HUMPHRY & A. WIcETr, supra note 66, at 16.
75. D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKErr, supra note 66, at 145.
76. D. HuMPHRY & A. WICKETr, supra note 66, at 139-40. The judge later remarked, "This
was a murder with no justification but an awful lot of mitigation." Id. at 140.
77. D. HUMPHRY & A. WicKETT, supra note 66, at 146. The judge stated, "I am satisfied that
there is no punishment I can impose that's more severe than what you have already suffered with the
death of your son." Id.
This list of cases is by no means exhaustive. As a further example, in 1983 Dorothy Healy, age
71, collapsed from the strain of trying to care for her severely ill husband and strangled him with a
nylon stocking. Healy pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and was given five years probation,
a $10,000 fine, and 1,000 hours community service. Id. at 144. The judge stated that there were
"moral and ethical reasons for her actions." Id. at 144-45. Sixty-six-year-old Joe Wilson was found
guilty of attempted murder in 1985 and given three years probation and 250 hours community ser-
vice after slashing the veins of his wife who had suffered several strokes in the past seven years. Id.
at 142.
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These cases clearly illustrate the discrepancy between the law as written
and as practiced. This gap between law and practice, like all legal fictions, cre-
ates more harm than good. One commentator recently noted:
Some commentators think this is as it should be: the law must not
condone mercy-killing, they say; but at the same time, it is appropriate
for judges and juries to treat defendants in these cases compassion-
ately. However, it is at least prima facie undesirable for there to be
such a wide gap here, for if we deem a type of behaviour not fit for
punishment, why should we continue to stigmatize that behaviour as
criminal? What is gained by putting the defendants through the
ordeal?
78
Mercy killings are different from the standard homicide and should not
receive the same treatment. Two steps should be taken, one judicial, one legisla-
tive, to close the gap between law and practice. First, judges must instruct juries
differently in mercy killing cases. The jury in the Forrest case was instructed
that malice exists when a person takes the life of another intentionally or "inten-
tionally inflict[s] serious bodily harm which proximately results in death without
just cause, excuse or justification."'79 This description omitted the word "mitiga-
tion," included originally by the supreme court in State v. Ellick80 and repeated
by North Carolina courts more recently. 81 A more appropriate jury instruction
would have provided that malice is that condition of the mind that prompts a
person to take the life of another without just cause, excuse, or mitigation. Ad-
ditionally, the trial court should have stated that if the defendant reasonably
believed his father to be suffering and close to death, such a belief would not
serve as a legal defense to murder but could be a factor capable of negating
malice and mitigating the offense to the lesser crime of voluntary manslaughter.
This instruction, applicable only in mercy killing cases, would have allowed the
jury to determine first, whether the defendant believed his father to be in pain
and near death, second, whether such a belief was reasonable, third, whether the
belief prompted the defendant to kill, and fourth, whether this belief was suffi-
cient to negate the element of malice.
A second solution to the law-practice gap is for state legislatures to take
action in the area of mercy killing. Many states have enacted "right to die" or
"living will" statutes permitting physicians to withhold or withdraw life support
treatment at the tequest of the patient.82 A legal distinction continues to be
78. J. RACHELS, supra note 65, at 170.
79. Forrest, 321 N.C. at 190, 362 S.E.2d at 255; see supra note 18. Because of poor wording, the
instruction could have been misinterpreted to mean that malice existed if the defendant inflicted
serious harm resulting in death without just cause, excuse or justification, or if defendant intention-
ally took the life of the victim. In other words, as was argued by defendant on appeal, the instruc-
tion could be understood as stating that malice exists whenever a person takes the life of another.
80. 60 N.C. 450, 459 (1864); see supra note 41.
81. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
82. See, eg., Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (Cum. Supp. 1983); Death
With Dignity, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 83-3801 to -3804 (Cum. Supp. 1983); Natural Death Act, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Cum. Supp. 1988); Death with Dignity Act, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); Natural Death Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to
-2430 (1987); Life Prolonging Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ANN §§ 765.01 to .15 (West 1986); Living
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made, however, between passive euthanasia-letting one die-- -and active eutha-
nasia-bringing about one's death.83 While the former is becoming more widely
accepted, the latter continues to be viewed by the law as an act of murder.
84
This distinction between passive and active euthanasia lies in the nature of the
action of the attending physician. 85 If the physician takes no action at all, such
as by withholding treatment, the omission constitutes a passive act. Legislatures
and courts have also held that disconnecting or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment, although clearly an action as opposed to an omission, is passive since
the patient still dies a natural death.86 Arguably, however, the passive/active
distinction is often unclear and should be discarded entirely. 87 The argument to
Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Cuxm. Supp. 1987); Right to
Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1985); Natural Death Act, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13 (Cum. Supp. 1987); Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.122.010 to .905 (West Cum. Supp. 1988). The North Carolina Natural Death Act provides
that in the event "a person has declared ... a desire that his life not be prolonged by extraordinary
means" and that declaration is in accordance with the requirements of the statute and has not been
revoked, "extraordinary means may be withheld or discontinued upon the direction and under the
supervision of the attending physician." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (1985). The purpose of this Act
is to recognize:
that an individual's rights include the tight to a peaceful and natural death and that a
patient or his representative has the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to
the rendering of his own medical care, including the decision to have extraordinary means
withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition.
Id. § 90-320. For a discussion of North Carolina's Natural Death Act, see Comment, North Caro-
lina's Natural Death Act Confronting Death with Dignity, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 771 (1978).
For a general discussion of living will legislation, see Sherlock, For Everything There is a Season:
The Right to Die in the United States, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 545, 597-615.
83. See Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE
219 (J. Arras & R. Hunt eds. 1983). This distinction was highlighted fifteen years ago by the Ameri-
can Medical Association which stated:
The intentional termination of the life of one human being by another-mercy killing-is
contrary to that for which the medical profession stands and is contrary to the policy of the
American Medical Association.
The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong the life of the
body when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent is the decision of
the patient/or his immediate family.
Id. at 219-20 (quoting the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association, December 4,
1973).
84. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
85. See Sherlock, supra note 82, at 550.
86. For cases permitting acts of passive euthanasia, see In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For a thorough
discussion of the Quinlan case, see Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the
Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 304 (1977); Comment, The Role of the Family in Medical
Decisionmaking for Incompetent Adult Patients: A Historical Perspective and Case Analysis, 48 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 539 (1987). The Quinlan court held that the right to refuse medical treatment stems
from the constitutional right to privacy. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. This ruling
reverses the traditional concept that states have a legal duty to preserve all life. See D. HUMPHRY &
A. WICKETr, supra note 66, at 231. Other courts have stated that the right to refuse medical treat-
ment is not constitutionally guaranteed, but is founded in the common law. See In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1951).
A number of states have passed "right to die" or "living will" statutes that permit a patient to
determine his or her own medical treatment. See supra note 82.
87. See Rachels, supra note 83, at 222; Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill
and the ConstitutionalRight o Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 363, 366 (1984); cf Gelfand, Euthana-
sia and the Terminally Ill Patient, 63 NEB. L. REv. 741, 753 (1984) (active and passive euthanasia
are legally indistinguishable and both should be illegal).
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dispense with the distinction has become more persuasive in recent years follow-
ing a series of cases in which courts have allowed doctors to remove feeding and
hydration tubes from dying patients. 88 In such instances, the patient may liter-
ally starve to death.89 It is difficult to see the legal distinction between allowing
a patient to die by starvation and bringing about death through injection. The
practical distinction, on the other hand, is clear: whereas the former may result
in protracted and painful death, the latter is quick and painless and thus more
humane.
If the intended effect of withdrawing medical treatment is to end suffering
by bringing about death as quickly as possible,90 one must question why it is so
unthinkable, ethically and at law, to terminate life altogether. The debate be-
comes a head-to-head conflict between two seemingly antithetical principals: on
one side a legal and ethical duty to preserve life;91 on the other a desire to mini-
mize suffering. It is arguable, however, that these goals are not entirely at odds;
when a patient's life holds only the prospect of pain and deterioration, the life to
be sustained can no longer be "the sort of free and rational activity that gives us
dignity."'92 Some commentators argue, therefore, that the law has not reached
far enough and that mercy killings committed pursuant to strict regulations
should be legalized.
93
Objections to the legalization of euthanasia are founded on both religious
and non-religious principles.94 Generally, opponents to active euthanasia em-
phasize the sanctity of human life.95 Other non-religious arguments against le-
galization include the danger of faulty medical determinations 96 and the
88. See Bouvia v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297 (1986); Barber v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484 (1983); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re
Conroy, 98 N.3. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747
P.2d 445 (1987).
In Barber, two doctors were charged with murder for removing intravenous tubes providing a
patient hydration and nourishment. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
The prosecution argued the doctors had, in effect, starved the patient to death, an act constituting
murder. The California court of appeals dismissed the action finding no difference between the use
of a respirator and intravenous feeding tubes. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The Barber deci-
sion reversed California's position that removing any life-support treatment was an act of murder.
See People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 607 (1966).
89. Death by starvation in North Carolina and most states constitutes first-degree murder. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cur. Supp. 1987).
90. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 (1985); supra note 82.
91. See Dyke, Beneficient Euthanasia and Benemortasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN
MEDICINE, supra note 83, at 216.
92. Arras & Hunt, Euthanasia and the Care of Dying Patients, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN
MEDICINE, supra note 83, at 204.
93. See D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKETr, supra note 66, at 295-98; J. RACHELS, supra note 65, at
182-87; Schiffer, Euthanasia and the Criminal Law, 42 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 93, 103 (1984).
94. The religious view generally can be summed up as follows: all life comes from God; only
God can take life away. See Jakobovitz, Some Recent Jewish Views on Euthanasia, in DEATH, DY-
ING AND EUTHANASIA 344 (D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1980); O'Rourke, Christian Affirmation of
Life, in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA, supra, at 362. For an example of non-religious objec-
tions to euthanasia, see generally Kamisar, supra note 65.
95. See, eg., Dyke, supra note 91, at 216 (killing is prima facie wrong).
96. See Kamisar, supra note 65, at 1005-13.
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probability of abuse.97 Clearly the most persuasive argument against the legali-
zation of active euthanasia, however, is the "slippery slope" or "wedge" the-
ory.98 This argument urges that no matter how justified active euthanasia may
seem at times, legalizing active euthanasia would so radically diminish our re-
spect for human life that it would become difficult to limit the use of euthanasia
or control its abuse. In other words, taking the first step would necessarily lead
to a second, less socially desirable one. It is asserted that permitting voluntary
active euthanasia would soon lead to legalization of involuntary active euthana-
sia9 9 and that, in time, we would be unable to stop the cold-blooded killing of
"inconvenient" relatives.100 However, as was noted by one commentator, "[i]f
our laws were altered so that anyone could carry out an act of euthanasia, the
absence of a clear line between those who might justifiably be killed and those
who might not would pose a real danger; but that is not what advocates of eu-
thanasia propose." 101
97. See, eg., Kamisar, supra note 65, at 979 (removing "'mercy-killings' from the ban of the
criminal law [should be strongly] resisted on the ground that it offers the patient far too little protec-
tion from not-so-necessary or not-so-merciful killings").
A recent Journal of the American Medical Association article illustrates the problem of abuse
and the need for control and guidelines. See It's over, Debbie, 259 J. A.M.A. 272 (1988). The piece
describes a young hospital resident who was awakened in the middle of the night to assist a patient
with whom he had had no prior contact. The twenty-year-old patient reportedly was having diffi-
culty sleeping. On reviewing the patient's chart, the resident learned that she was dying of ovarian
cancer, would not respond to chemotherapy treatments, and was suffering from unrelenting vomit-
ing. When the resident entered the room, the patient's only words were "Let's get this over with."
Without consulting with the patient or the patient's mother, both of whom were in the room, the
resident decided to administer a lethal dose of morphine. He told the patient only that he was giving
her something to help her rest and told the patient's mother to say good-bye. Id.
This article has caused a tremendous uproar in the medical community. One doctor called the
incident an "ethical travesty." Essay on Mercy Killing has Doctors in Uproar, The News & Observer
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 2, 1988, at 2A, col. 1 (quoting Dr. Arthur Caplan, director of the Center for
Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota). Prosecutors have initiated proceedings against
the American Medical Association in an effort to learn the identity of the author of the article. The
AMA has refused to release the author's name based on first amendment grounds. See Euthanasia
Essay Raises Ethics Debate, The News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 28, 1988, at 9A, col. 1.
98. See Kamisar, supra note 65, at 1030-41.
99. Voluntary euthanasia is when an incurably in patient chooses to die. Some believe this is
encouragement to commit suicide. See J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 173 (1960). Invol-
untary euthanasia is the merciful killing of a human being who is incapable of consenting to the
request. See G. WILLiAMS, THE SANCTrrY OF LIFE 347 (1957); Note, supra note 87, at 365 n.12.
See generally Sherlock, supra note 82, at 548-50. Because "involuntary" suggests acting against the
will of the patient, it has been suggested the term "non-voluntary" would be a more accurate de-
scription of the euthanatizing of an incompetent patient. J. RACHELS, supra note 65, at 179.
100. See J. RACHELS, supra note 65, at 172-75. Advocates of the slippery slope theory point to
the results which occurred in Nazi Germany. See Kamisar, supra note 65, at 1038. There, the
legalization of euthanasia for persons incurably ill gradually developed into the killing of persons
"socially unproductive" and eventually into the killing of all non-Germans. Singer, Killing and
Letting Die, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 83, at 210, 214. Professor
Kamisar suggested we must "snuff out" such "small beginnings" here. Kamisar, supra note 65, at
1038. Although it is naive to believe that the atrocities of Nazi Germany were the result of legalizing
euthanasia, this does not negate entirely the threat of the slippery slope.
101. Singer, supra note 100, at 215. Others believe legalization is either unnecessary or undesir-
able and that courts should simply recognize euthanasia as justification for a killing. See M.
HEIIFETZ, THE RIGHT TO DIE 117 (1975) (stating that although killing must remain a crime and
never be legalized, "[wle must pass laws that grant the courts the right to consider and honor moti-
vation and intent in cases of euthanasia and the right to declare no penalty"); J. RACHELS, supra note
65, at 182-87 (mercy killing should be recognized as a legal defense to murder). This approach,
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Proponents of legalizing active euthanasia stress the importance of individ-
ual liberty 0 2 and human dignity,10 3 and the humane goal of reducing suffer-
ing.'O4 Laws that propose legalizing voluntary active euthanasia contain
protections against the risks of misdiagnosis and abuse. The best example of
such legislation to date is California's proposed Humane and Dignified Death
A'ct.105 This act would permit physicians under certain strict conditions to re-
spond to terminally ill patients' written directives and to either withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining procedures or administer "aid-in-dying. °10 6 Under the
proposed act, patients who have executed directives requesting aid-in-dying
within the past seven years may be humanely put to death if the patient has been
diagnosed as suffering from a terminal condition. 10 7 The directive would have
to be signed by the declarant in the presence of two disinterested witnesses10 8
however, would be the least protective we could take. The potential for abuse would be overwhelm-
ing since facts could be exaggerated or altered to justify a killing.
102. See, eg., Singer, supra note 100, at 211.
103. See, eg., T. BEAUCHAMP & S. PERLIN, supra note 1, at 217.
104. One commentator has stated that not permitting mercy killing amounts to an act of "cru-
elty" by forcing a human being to linger in agony and refusing his demand for "merciful release."
Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Legislation-A Rejoinder, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1958).
105. This proposed legislation, to be introduced before the California legislature some time dur-
ing 1988, is authored by Los Angeles attorneys Robert Risley and Michael White with the assistance
of the Hemlock Society and sponsored by Americans Against Human Suffering. See D. HUMPHRY
& A. WIC=rT, supra note 66, at 295. In their preamble, the authors state:
Adult persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering
of their own medical care, including the decisions to have life-sustaining procedures with-
held or withdrawn or, if suffering from terminal condition, to request a physician to admin-
ister aid-in-dying.
Modem medical technology has made possible the artificial prolongation of human
life beyond natural limits. The prolongation of life for persons with terminal conditions
may cause loss of patient dignity and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing noth-
ing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to expect, the
State of California shall recognize the right of an adult person to make a written directive
instructing his or her physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures or, if
suffering from a terminal condition, to administer aid-in-dying.
AMERICANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, HUMANE AND DIGNIFIED DEATH AcT § 2525.1 (No-
vember 1, 1987) [hereinafter "HDDA"].
106. "Aid-in-dying" is defined by the HDDA as "any medical procedure that will terminate the
life of the qualified patient swiftly, painlessly, and humanely." HDDA § 2525.2(h).
107. Under the HDDA, "terminal condition" means:
an incurable condition which would, in the opinion of the two certifying physicians exercis-
ing reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and when the application of the life-
sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone the moment of death of the patient,
and in the case of a patient requesting aid-in-dying, in the opinion of such physicians such
condition or conditions would produce death within six months.
HDDA § 2525.2(g).
108. The HDDA provides:
The directive shall be signed by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related
to the declarant by blood or marriage and who would not be entitled to any portion of the
estate of the declarant upon his or her death under any will of the declarant or codicil
thereto then existing or, at the time of the directive, by operation of law then existing. In
addition, a witness to a directive shall not be the attending physician, an employee of the
attending physician or a health care facility in which the declarant is a patient, or any
person who, at the time of the execution of the directive, has a claim against any portion of




and could be revoked at any time without regard to the declarant's mental con-
dition.10 9 Additionally, the declarant would be able to name an "attorney-in-
fact" who would have the power to make health-care decisions for a patient
incapable of doing so herself. 110 Any request by an attorney-in-fact to adminis-
ter aid-in-dying, however, would have to be reviewed by a three member hospi-
tal committee to ensure that all procedures had been followed and the time of
death had been properly decided by the attorney-in-fact and the physicians.111
The proposed Humane and Dignified Death Act is carefully worded to protect
against the fears of voluntary active euthanasia legislation opponents. The possi-
bility of abuse or misdiagnosis has been virtually eliminated and no legal protec-
tion is available to those who commit an act of active euthanasia which does not
strictly follow the procedures set forth.
Any legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia presents the threat
of the slippery slope. However, to maintain the legal fiction that mercy killing
will not be tolerated is the most senseless and least protective approach we can
take. Our legal system must recognize that merciful killing is both widely ac-
cepted and practiced. Without laying down guidelines as to how and under
what circumstances active euthanasia may be applied, the situation will only
become steadily worse. Specific statutes such as the Humane and Dignified
Death Act can correct the constant threat a grieving family member will attempt
to take the law into his own hands or that a sleepy-eyed resident will quickly
misread a chart, incorrectly interpret a request, and put an innocent victim to
death. 
112
John Forrest's actions cannot be exonerated. However, in light of societal
trends, court decisions in other jurisdictions, and recent developments in the law
concerning the right to die, the first-degree murder charge and life sentence were
too harsh. One cannot help but question the sense of inequity in a legal system
that imprisons one defendant for life while it lets another go free, though both
committed practically identical crimes. Advances in technology will force an
increase in the number of cases like John Forrest's. It is up to our courts and
legislatures to respond in a way that reflects society's changing attitude. First,
109. HDDA § 2525.5.
110. The HDDA defines "attorney-in-fact" as:
an agent of the person or patient signing the directive, appointed for the purpose of making
decisions relating to the patient's medical care and treatment, including withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures and physician aid in dying, in the event the patient becomes incom-
petent to make those decisions. An attorney-in-fact shall be an adult, who may, but need
not, be related to the person or patient, but an attorney-in-fact need not be an attorney or a
lawyer.
HDDA § 2525.2(i).
111. The HDDA provides:
The decision of a attorney-in-fact to request a physician to administer aid-in-dying shall
first be reviewed by a hospital committee of three persons to assure all the following:
(1) The directive was properly executed and witnessed.
(2) The directive has not been revoked by the patient.
(3) The physicians have certified the patient is terminal.
(4) The time of death is properly decided by the attorney-in-fact and the physician.
HDDA § 2525.10(a)
112. See supra note 97.
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courts in North Carolina should respond by adjusting the jury instruction to
recognize mercy killing as a mitigating circumstance capable of negating the
element of malice and reducing first-degree murder to the lesser offense of man-
slaughter. Second, the legislature must consider and pass voluntary active eu-
thanasia laws which allow terminally ill patients to choose quick and painless
death over death which is prolonged, debilitating, and painful. 113 Technological
advances have greatly enhanced our ability to sustain life. The life sustained,
however, is often of questionable quality. The law must respond with advances
of its own and allow individuals to die a painless and dignified death.
TIMOTHY PAUL BROOKS
113. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text. When Charlotte Perkins Gilman, an early
feminist crusader who was dying of cancer, committed suicide, she left a note stating, "'The time is
approaching when we shall consider it abhorrent to our civilization to allow a human being to lie in
prolonged agony which we should mercifully end in any other creature."' D. HUMPIIRY & A.
WICKE-rr, supra note 66, at 15 (quoting Charlotte Perkins Gilman in Wolbarst, The Doctor Looks at
Euthanasia, 149 MED. RECORD 354 (1939)).
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